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to realty. To allow courts to liberally interpret statutes which are in deroga-
tion of the common law will undoubtedly increase the confusion with the
concomitant perplexity as to the ownership of realty. However, the decision
of the court in the instant case will be followed, purportedly because of the
incapacity of the trustees to contract away public property, but in reality on
the basis of public policy.
TAXATION-RECEIPTS OF NON-PROFIT CLUB FROM ITS
MEMBERS HELD NOT EXEMPT UNDER SECTION 101(9)
OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Petitioner, tmember club of the American Automobile Association, was
a non-profit group organized primarily to furnish services to its members
at a lower price than such services could be obtained elsewhere had the mem-
bers acted individually. Petitioner did not itself furnish labor or material
for these services but merely procured them for its members. It issued no
shares of stock and paid no dividends. Its charter required that its assets be
transferred to another non-profit organization in case of dissolution. The
Commissioner sought to collect federal income tax on receipts of petitioner
in the form of dues and entrance fees. Petitioner contended that it was exempt
from tax under Section 101(9) of the Internal Revenue Code' as a non-
profit organization. Held, that since petitioner was engaged in a business
of a kind generally carried on for profit, and since its members received
services at a discount from the usual market price, it was not exempt under
Section 101(9). Chattanooga Automobile Club v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 12 T. C. No. 29 (1949).2
The holding of the principal case, if affirmed on appeal, will constitute
a landmark in the law of federal income taxation. The idea is a novel one
indeed that a non-profit organization, formed for the purpose of securing
services cheaper for its members, should be subject to federal income tax on
the dues and other fees paid by the individual members in order to make
possible the availability to them of such services. From earliest days farmers,
fruit growers, merchants, and other entrepreneurs have formed associations
for the express purpose of buying collectively to effect savings over individual
buying costs. The resulting intake of the association or club from its individual
members has universally been held tax exempt. In a subsequent section of
the Internal Revenue Code 8 farmers' marketing and purchasing cooperatives
1. "The following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this
chapter-. . . (9) Clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and
other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder .... P
2. Sea also the companion case, Keystone Automobile Club v. Commissioner 4.1
Internal Revenue, 12 T. C. No. 134 (1949).
3. 1VT. Rnv. CODE , 101 (12).
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are specifically exempted from federal income tax. Even consumers' cooper-
atives, which enjoy no such statutory exemption, have been exempted, by
administrative practice, as long as their excess of receipts over disbursements
is turned back to the co-op members. 4 No "profit" is said to accrue to the
cooperative; and this is true even where the excess receipts are not distributed
to the members in cash.,
Granting that the tax exemption presently afforded to consumers' co-
operatives is not warranted in certain situations, a debatable admission at
best, certainli clubs organized for non-profitable purposes fall within the tax
exempt category as conceived by Congress. Under the language of the gov-
erning statute itself, clubs . .. operated for . . . nonprofitable purposes,
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder . . ." are exempt from the income tax. One could hardly describe
the situation of petitioner in the instant case in more adequate phraseology.
Admittedly, services were made available to members at a discount from the
regular market price. But this was the very reason for petitioner's existence,
just as in the case of any collective buying venture. The court confuses
"profits" with savings. If A buys a watch on.Monday at the X jewelry store
for the price of $10, but B purchases the same model watch on Tuesday for
$9, the conclusion that B has made a profit on the transaction would be little
short of ludicrous. True, B may have saved $1, but that dollar is certainly
not taxable as a profit under the federal income tax laws.7 More than that,
petitioner had no stockholders in its organization: The gains involved accrued
to its members. It simply acted as a purchasing agent for those members, not
as a corporate distributor of profits to absentee investors. The mere receipt,
even by an organization for profit, of money or property has never implied
taxable income.8 Nor have the courts labeled intake as taxable income al-
though distribution of the excess of receipts over disbursements was made
to shareholders.9 The presence of receipts in the treasury of petitioner should
have been held a trust fund belonging to its individual members. "Even
Congress can't snake income out of something which is not income in fact." 19
An appellate court should have little difficulty in finding grounds for reversal
of the holding in the instant case."'
4. See Sowards. Should Co-ops Pay Frderal Income Ta's?, 19 TF.xx. L. REV.
908 (1947).
5. Id. at 917.
6. See O'Meara, The Federal Income Tax in Relation in Consumer Cooperatives,
36 ILL. L. REV. 60 (1936).
7. See Uniform Printing and Supply Co. v. Comin'r.. 88 F.2d 75 (C. C, A. 7th
19,37).
8. Farmers' Union Cooperative Co. v. Comm'r., 90 F.2d 488 (C. C. A. 8th 1937).
9. Ibid.
10, Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n. v. Hopkins. 269 U. S. 110, 114 (1925).
11. California State Automobile Ass'n. v. Smyth. 77 F. Snpp. 131 (N. D. Calif.
1948).
